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Abstract: Partiality refers to the special concern that we display to 
ourselves and other people with whom we stand in some special per-
sonal relationship. It is a central theme in moral philosophy, both an-
cient and modern. Questions about the justification of partiality arise 
in the context of enquiry into the good life and the role of our per-
sonal commitments, the demands of impartial morality, equality and 
other moral ideals, or common-sense ideas about supererogation. This 
paper provides an overview of the debate on the ethics of partiality 
through the lens of focusing on the domain of permissible and re-
quired partiality. After outlining the conceptual space, I first discuss 
agent-centred moral options which concern permissions not to do 
what would be impartially optimal. I then focus on required partiality, 
which concerns associative duties that go beyond your general duties 
to others, and which require us to give special priority to people who 
are close to us. I then turn to the justification of partiality, focusing 
on underivative approaches and reasons-based frameworks. I survey 
arguments for ‘the big three’ according to which partiality is justified 
by appeal to either the special value of projects, valuable personal re-
lationships, or the special value of individuals. I conclude by discuss-
ing a new emerging area in the debate, namely negative partiality, 
which concerns what we owe our moral adversaries as opposed to in-
timates. 
Keywords: Partiality, Permissible Partiality, Required Partiality, Op-
tions, Prerogatives, Associative Duties, Supererogation, Reduction-




1. Introduction  
The focus in this paper is partiality: the special concern that we display to ourselves 
and other people with whom we stand in some special personal relationship, in terms 
of both our actions and attitudes. The over-arching narrative question for us will be: 
“What, if anything, may justify partiality?” 
Take a moment to reflect on those endeavours that are centrally important in your 
life. Like most people, you probably have personal commitments, goals, and hobbies 
as well as personal relationships with your family, friends, and colleagues that you 
value. You will see these endeavours as giving you good reasons for actions and atti-
tudes that other people lack—you are partial to your hobby of playing the drums even 
though you could spend your time doing something better from an impartial point of 
view. And when it comes to your relationships, you will see yourself as owing more to 
your children, spouse, and friends than to people who are completely unrelated to you. 
You will feel joy and excitement when your pursuits and intimates fare well and sad-
ness and grief when they fare poorly. Intuitively, partiality is an obvious and justified 
fact of life. 
Partiality is a central theme in ancient and modern moral philosophy.1 At the same 
time, the literature is scattered across many sub-areas and debates, because the field 
has various entry points. One starting point into reflections on partiality begins with 
the perennial question of ancient ethics: How may I live well?2 This may lead to a 
concern with the role of personal commitments in a good life. A second starting point 
is impartiality—roughly, the idea that we ought to promote the good impartially—
and tries to resist it or harmonize it with partiality.3 In a sense, the impartial standpoint 
needs to have special grip on you, for you to fight for partiality. Impartial theories such 
as consequentialism have famously been charged with being too demanding by turning 
 
1 See Aristotle (1894), NE bks VIII and IX, Hume (1777), p. 146, Sidgwick (1874), p. 242, 
Ross (1930), p. 21, Nagel (1970), pp. 129-130, (1980), pp. 119-126 and (1995); Williams 
(1973), p. 110 and (1981), ch. 2; Walzer (1970), ch. 1; Wassertrom (1975), p. 4; Mackie 
(1977), pp. 157-8; and Parfit (1983), pp. 35-36, and (1984), p. 95, 485. For more compre-
hensive surveys, see Goodin (1985), ch. 1, Feltham (2010), and Keller (2013), ch. 1.  
2 A good starting point is Aristotle’s NE bks VIII and IX. See also Annas (1993), p. 27, and 
Cottingham (1998). 
3 Scheffler’s (1982) The Rejection of Consequentialism is a good example of this approach (the 





us into nodes in a maximizing calculus of value or alienating us from ourselves.4 But 
Kantian or other deontological theories may also seem objectionably impartial, ab-
stracting from the identity of persons and thereby failing to make room for a particular 
person’s agency.5  
Defending partiality can give us breathing space from the stringent demands of mo-
rality and make it a more human as opposed to distant and austere phenomenon.6 The 
stakes in this debate are high: in so far as some consequentialist or deontological im-
partialist theories are unable to justify partiality, we may face a seismic shift at the level 
of normative theorizing, being forced to move away from these theories in search for 
more plausible alternatives.7 In other contexts, partiality may put pressure on other 
important moral ideals such as those of moral equality and freedom.8 The ethics of 
partiality therefore sits at some of the very core issues in ethics. 
In light of the heterogeneity of the partiality literature, I find it helpful to divide it into 
permissible partiality, on the one hand, and required partiality, on the other. Permissi-
ble partiality concerns your permissions not to do what would be impartially optimal. 
Required partiality concerns associative duties which go beyond your general duties to 
others and which require you to give special moral priority to people who are close to 
you, such as your family, friends, or other intimates. 
Below I first describe the conceptual space available (Section 2) and then give an over-
view of the domains of permissible and required partiality (Section 3 and 4). I then 
review some of the most influential lines of defence for permissions and requirements. 
(Section 5). I conclude with some recent trends in the ethics of partiality literature 
(Section 6).  
 
4 Williams (1973), pp. 116-17.  
5 Williams (1981), ch. 1.  
6 Some examples, though not exhaustive, are Stocker (1976) and (1996), Scheffler (1994), 
chs. 1. and 2, and Seglow (2010), p. 14.  
7 Brink (2009), for example, argues that consequentialist theories are unable to account for 
associative duties. A natural way to understand partiality in the context of consequentialist 
theorizing is hence the question: “How much can we modify the consequentialist value func-
tion?”. 
8 For an excellent discussion, see Nagel (1995) on impartiality, equality, and partiality. An-
other example of how partiality may come into conflict with liberty and equality is the justi-




2. Conceptual Space 
We can distinguish four different positions on partiality: 
 No Partiality: Partiality cannot plausibly be defended.  
On this view, there is no breathing space and escape from morality’s stringency.9 The 
most forceful defence of this can be attributed to Kagan (1991), though he argues for 
the stronger claim that no moderate morality understood as permissions to deviate from 
doing what would be impartially optimal as well as any constraints on doing what is 
impartially optimal, can be justified.10  
Permissible Partiality Only: There exist permissions only to deviate from do-
ing what would be impartially optimal. 
On this view, you are sometimes permitted to forgo doing what is impartially optimal, 
but you are never required to do so.11 For example, sometimes you might be permitted 
to focus on your interests or spending time with your good friend instead of doing 
what impartial morality would demand. However, on this picture, you would never 
do anything wrong if you nonetheless chose to do what would be impartially optimal. 
Required Partiality Only: There exist only associative duties to give special 
priority to your intimates (plausibly, in addition to other general duties). 
Conversely, this view says that you can be required only to act partially, and never 
merely permitted to do so.12 Even though this view might sound a bit extreme, it does 
 
9 To be clear, this claim applies probably more to the absence of permissions as opposed to 
associative duties, since the absence of more stringent duties to look after our intimates may 
indeed, in one respect, give us more ‘freedom’.  
10 Kagan (1991), chs. 1 and 2, gives a helpful overview; see chs. 5 and 6 on the (impossibility 
of the) justification options. See also Crisp (2018) for a more recent critique of partiality. 
11 See Scheffler (1982), ch. 2 for an outline of his defence of a ‘agent-centred prerogative’. 
Stroud (2010) also explores permissible partiality only. 
12 Theorists such as Ross (1930), Carrit (1947), and Prichard (2002) did not allow for su-
pererogation and endorsed ‘duties only’ pictures. See Hurka (2014), ch. 8, for an insightful 
analysis, especially pp. 178-83. Some consequentialist views such as that developed by Railton 
(1984) can also be construed as ‘required partiality only’ accounts. However, they account for 
partiality indirectly or in a self-effacing manner by maintaining that doing what is impartially 
required is extensionally equivalent with being partial. I return to the issue of accounting for 





seem intuitively plausible when considering some special personal relationships. For 
example, we might think that the parents are mostly under special requirements to 
care for their children. 
Full Partiality: There exist permissions to deviate from doing what would be 
impartially optimal and associative duties to give special moral priority to your 
intimates.  
This picture is what most people intuitively endorse and what probably is most closely 
aligned with common-sense morality. On this view, you have permissions to deviate 
from doing the best, but in some cases, you will also be required to act in certain ways 
toward your intimates. 
 
3. Permissible Partiality 
A helpful way to think about the domain of permissible partiality is in the context of 
the previously mentioned fight for breathing space from morality’s stringent demands. 
Much of the literature here reacts to impartial theories such as maximizing consequen-
tialism, trying to make room for the optionality of acting on our personal point of 
view. 
3.1 Options 
More formally, permissible partiality concerns  
Agent-Centred Moral Options (henceforth just “options”): A permission to 
bring about an outcome that is impartially suboptimal because it promotes 
your own or your intimates’ interests. 
Options are also commonly referred to as ‘prerogatives’ or just ‘permissions’. They 
permit you to act non-optimally if you choose to do so, but they do not require that 
you act in a non-optimal way. ‘Interests’ here can be understood narrowly in terms of 
our self-concern, desires, or preferences, or more broadly in terms of objective goods 
such as valuable personal relationships.13 A central feature of options is that they are 
agent-relative; they are indexed to you and your specific interests and consequently give 
 
13 It’s common to assume that the interests protected by options do not only refer to pure 
self-concern; see Kagan (1989), pp. 6-10. For an overview of different accounts of well-being, 




you permissions to help your friend over a stranger, but not necessarily someone else 
to do the same.14   
3.2 Options to do what? 
Hardly anyone who thinks that options exist, denies the existence of  
Self-Favouring Options: Permissions to bring about an impartially suboptimal 
outcome because it favours your own interests; 15,16  
and 
Other-Favouring Options: Permissions to bring about an impartially subopti-
mal outcome because it favours your intimates’ interests. 
For example, you might be permitted to give one unit of happiness to yourself as op-
posed to five units to a stranger, or you may permissibly give two units of happiness 
to your long-term friend as opposed to five to a stranger.  
More controversial is the existence of so-called  
Self-Sacrificing Options: Permissions to bring about an impartially suboptimal 
outcome because it discounts your own interests.17 
The idea here is that you can sometimes permissibly forgo a greater benefit to yourself 
for the sake of providing a lesser benefit to someone else. For example, you might forgo 
five units of happiness for yourself to give your friend one unit of happiness.  
 
14 On agent-relativity see Parfit (1984), p. 27, and Nagel (1986), ch. 9.   
15 Early discussions of this permission are in Parfit (1977), Davis (1980), and Scheffler 
(1982).  
16 My exposition of options here presupposes what I have called a List Picture (see Lange 
(2020), section 3). On this view, there is a list of different kinds of options, based on who 
enjoys the benefits or suffers the burdens—oneself, or others. This is not the only picture that 
you can endorse. According to the Agent- Neutral/Relative Picture, permissible partiality is un-
derstood as permissibly acting from an agent-relative point of view; see Bader (2020), section 
3, on this. Kamm (1992), pp. 362-3, also seems to allude to this agent-relative picture. 
17 Stocker (1976) first noted the existence of this option. See Slote (1984; 1985) for further 
discussion. For a detailed discussion of the relation between self-sacrificing options and op-
tions to favour your own interests, see Hurka and Shubert (2012). For an exploration of the 
relation between other-favouring and other-sacrificing, see Lange (2020) and Brandt and 




The reason why the existence of these self-sacrificing options is more controversial is 
that they appear antithetical to the idea that moral closeness increases our options to 
favour.18 It seems plausible that you can favour intimates more than strangers, because 
your intimates are closer to you. Likewise, common-sense morality also suggests that 
you can significantly favour yourself over intimates and strangers, because you are 
‘closest to yourself’—an ultimate intimate. But if this picture is true, then why should 
you ever be permitted to sacrifice your own interests for others?  
More recently, some have additionally defended the existence of  
Other-Sacrificing Options: A permission to bring about an impartially subop-
timal outcome because it discounts your adversaries’ interests.19 
This option concerns permissions to act or not act in certain ways toward the moral 
opposite of your intimates: your moral adversaries. When dealing with your adversaries, 
you might sometimes be permitted to give lesser weight to the interests of your adver-
saries than to the interests of strangers. For example, you may permissibly give a 
stranger one unit of happiness as opposed to three units to your adversary. You might, 
for example, think that someone who behaves like a jerk to you for no reason can be 
treated to you in this way. 
One of the challenges for defenders of other-sacrificing options is to plausibly explain 
why the response to discount our adversaries is not an impartial phenomenon. We 
might think that the reason that your bully’s interests should be discounted should be 
explained by the agent-neutral notion of desert.  
 
4. Required Partiality 
Debate about required partiality can arise in the context of impartiality, but entry 
points are more diverse, ranging from the common-sense idea that ‘we owe more’ to 
people who are, in some sense, closer to us, to the justification of political obligation.20  
4.1 Associative Duties  
 
18 Slote (1984), p. 185 
19 See Brandt (2020) and Lange (2020) for defences of this option. See Eskens (forthcoming) 
for a critique.  
20 For literature on associative accounts on why we must obey the law of our country or state, 




Required partiality concerns 
Associative Duties: Requirements to act in certain ways in virtue of the special 
relationships in which you stand to your intimates.21 
Associative duties are also sometimes referred to as ‘special obligations’ or ‘duties of 
partiality’. In contrast to options, they are ‘presumptively decisive’ agent-relative con-
siderations and require you to be partial to your intimates. Failing to discharge your 
duties accordingly means that you will have wronged your intimate.  
Associative duties are duties that you owe to people that are close qua some special 
relationship (be it in virtue of a personal history, affection, love, or group membership) 
such as your children, parents, siblings, spouses, friends, colleagues, peers, compatri-
ots, or even same members of your species. They go beyond our general or natural 
duties to others and may require that you do distinctive things for your intimates, give 
extra weight to them, or do more of what you would have to do for strangers. 
4.2 Strength of Associative Duties 
Associative duties are not only more extensive than general duties to other people, but 
also have much greater strength. The strength of associative duties can be understood 
in terms of three other features.22  
(1) Stringency 
First, associative duties are not so easily overridden as positive duties to others by con-
siderations of cost to oneself. For example, although you may be expected to bear some 
cost to provide assistance to a stranger, you may be expected to bear greater costs in 
order to provide comparable assistance to my brother or my child. So, you might have 
to risk your life to save your child from drowning in a river, but you might not be 
required to incur the same risk to your life if the person at risk would just be a stranger.  
(2) Gravity 
 
21 The term ‘associative duties’ is commonly adapted from Dworkin (1986), p. 196, who 
speaks of ‘associative obligations’ to refer to ‘the special responsibilities social practice attaches 
to membership in some biological or social group, like the responsibilities of family or friends 
or neighbours’.  
22 See Scheffler (2001) ‘Families, Nations, and Strangers’, pp. 51-4. On the strength of as-
sociative duties see also Lazar (2013), pp. 14-15, and (2016), p. 33. Kamm (1996), p. 313, 




A second feature of associative duties is that they often take precedence over general 
duties in cases where the two conflict. If both a sister and stranger need assistance but 
you can help only one of them, you might be required to help the sister even if you 
would have been required to help the stranger had they been the only person in need 
of assistance. This holds even if the sister’s need is less urgent than that of the stranger.  
(3) Overridingness 
Third, associative duties are sometimes considered to have a different threshold at 
which they can override other duties. For example, the threshold at which a positive 
duty can override a negative duty is sometimes lower if the positive is to an intimate, 
than it would be if the positive duty were to a stranger. For example, you might be 
sometimes required or permitted to harm some person in order to provide a badly 
needed benefit for your sister or child, though this might be wrong for your to do in 
order to provide a comparable benefit to a stranger. Conversely, the threshold at which 
positive duty can override negative duty is sometimes higher if negative duty is to a 
family member than it would be to a stranger. It may be that it is sometimes permis-
sible to inflict a lesser harm on one stranger to prevent a much greater harm to another 
stranger, though this would be wrong if the person to inflict lesser harm were your 
sister or child.  
4.3 Two Objections to Associative Duties 
There’s lots to say about associative duties. If there are two objections to them that 
you should you learn more about, they are the following. They highlight how a com-
mitment to partiality can come into conflict with other ideals such as freedom and 
equality.  
Voluntarist Objection 
The voluntarist objection is an objection against the special responsibilities that are 
supposed to arise out of non-consensual actions.23 It is, in effect, an objection on behalf 
of the individual who is supposed to be bound by associative duties. As a child I might 
be required to impose much greater cost on myself to help my parents than the cost 
that I would have to impose on myself in order to help a stranger, yet I did not choose 
to become their child. Associative duties, if they can apply to agents absent of any 
 
23 Scheffler’s ‘Families, Nations, and Strangers’ first developed this objection. See Scheffler 




relevant consensual act, would, according to the voluntarist, therefore constitute an 
unreasonable constraint on the individual in question. 
If we are not prepared to deny that children have associative duties towards their par-
ents, there are three main ways to reply: (i) attempt to show that all of the associative 
duties that they defend really are contractual or promissory in nature, or (ii) show that 
while not all associative duties are contractual, they nevertheless are similar in a rele-
vant respect, (iii) bite the bullet and maintain that, in some cases, associative duties 
can arise absent an agent’s consent.24 
Distributive Objection  
The distributive objection focuses not on the unreasonable burdens that being bound 
by associative duties seem to impose on an individual, but instead on the objectionable 
feature of supplying participants in special relationships with benefits that appear to 
be unreasonable.25 This is, in effect, an objection on behalf of the individuals who are 
neither bound by nor benefit from associative duties. 
By way of illustrating the distributive objection, imagine a three-person society that 
consists of A, B, and C. Imagine that all three owe general duties toward each other. 
Suppose now that A and B start to form a special personal relationship. This relation-
ship brings them a number of beneficial rewards. One of these rewards is that partici-
pation in the relationship itself may be inherently rewarding and contribute to their 
participants’ flourishing. It also changes the structure of their duties, providing A and 
B with associative duties to one another. Once A and B enter into a special relation-
ship, C is disadvantaged in at least in three ways: (1) where A and B might have ben-
efited C supererogatorily, their focus will now be on each other; (2) when it is impos-
sible for them to perform their general duties both to each other and to C, it is C who 
will always lose out; and (3) sometimes the associative duties that A and B owe to one 
another will override their general duties to C. 
The distributive objection thus sees associative duties as providing additional ad-
vantages to people who have already benefited from participation in rewarding groups 
and relationships, and it views this as unjustifiable when the provision of these addi-
tional advantages is to the disadvantage of those who are needier, either because they 
 
24 See Jeske (2019), section four, for an overview of different responses available.  




are not themselves participants in rewarding groups or relationships, or because they 
have significantly fewer resources of other kinds to begin with. 
One response to the distributive objection is to insist that upon acquiring associative 
duties, you do not owe less to others, but simply more to your intimates. So, for ex-
ample, in addition to our duty of benevolence, you might have additional duties to 
your intimates. But discharging these duties need not mean that you are required to 
do less for strangers.26  
 
5. Justifying Partiality 
The literature on justifying partiality can be confusing. One reason for this is that it is 
not always clear if the aim is to justify permissions or requirements, or both. A second 
reason is that the debate about justification takes place at different levels. Before we 
discuss the particular grounds of associative duties and options, let’s consider two ‘high 
level’ frameworks within which partiality can be justified. 
5.1 Underivative and Reasons-based Approaches 
According to  
Underivative Approaches, agent-centred options and associative duties are 
grounded in independent and underivative permissions and duties (as opposed 
to normative reasons).27 
These approaches justify partiality not by appeal to more basic factors such as norma-
tive reasons or ‘ought other things equal’, but in fundamental notions that are them-
selves permissive or deontic. For example, a version of this approach might say that 
there is a prima facie duty of beneficence for you to promote the interests of everyone 
impartially, but in addition to this duty, you have permissions to either pursue or not 
pursue your own interest. In some cases, your permissions outweigh your duty of be-
neficence, and this grants you options not to bring about the impartially optimal 
 
26 Scheffler (2001), p. 105-10, also responds to voluntarist and distributive objections. See 
Kolodny (2002) and Lazar (2009) on the distributive objection.   





outcome. In the case of required partiality, underivative approaches might hold that 
your associative duties are strengthened general duties of beneficence.28  
According to 
Reasons-based Approaches, options and associative duties are grounded in nor-
mative reasons.  
The starting point of this approach is typically to say that there are two fundamental 
kinds of reasons: agent-neutral reasons and agent-relative reasons.29 In the case of per-
missible partiality, options are then grounded in the conflict of agent-relative and 
agent-neutral reasons. For example, according to one view you have agent-neutral rea-
son to do what is best from the impartial perspective and agent-relative reason to do 
what is best from the agent-relative perspective. You have a permission to act impar-
tially suboptimally in some situation just in case your agent-neutral and agent-relative 
reason favour conflicting courses of action. If this is the case, then you are permitted 
to take on either perspective and do what is either agent-neutrally or agent-relatively 
optimal.30 
In the case of required partiality, reasons-based approaches ground associative duties 
in ‘presumptively decisive’ agent-relative normative reasons to act in a in special ways 
with respect to our intimates. These approaches must then give a story for why certain 
grounds give rise to such particularly strong reasons. For example, as we shall see be-
low, we might think that certain valuable personal relationships based on mutual inti-
macy and love can give rise to reasons of this sort.  
3.4 The Reductionism and Nonreductionism Debate 
A central issue in the partiality debate is whether partiality can be justified reductively 
by appeal to more basic moral principles or non-reductively by appeal to sui generis 
options or duties. The importance of this issue goes back to the stakes mentioned 
previously in the introduction about the correct moral theory. If partiality can be 
 
28 Hurka (2016), section 5, defends this view.  
29 You can dig deeper: Why are there two distinct kinds of reasons? According to one view, 
agent-relative reasons are grounded in the intrinsic value in permitted projects (Nagel 1989), 
or in the more general value of having ‘space’ in which to pursue our personal lives (Scheffler 
1982). 
30 See Bader (2020) for a recent defence of a decision-theoretic form of dual-ranking act-
consequentialism based on this framework of normative reasons. Other versions of dual-rank-




accounted for derivatively, then we might be able to keep our commitment to impar-
tial theories such as consequentialism; however, if partiality must be accounted for 
non-derivatively, we might face a seismic shift at the level of normative theorizing.  
The reductionist-nonreductionist debate occurs more in the arena of required as op-
posed to permissible partiality. The reason for this is that derivative approaches for the 
existence of options do not really account for options but rather debunk them. For 
example, according to Railton’s (1994) self-effacing view, there exist agent-neutral rea-
sons to promote the good impartially, but it turns out that, as a matter of fact, being 
partial to our intimates will accomplish what is impartially best.31 But this gives us not 
options, but just a requirement to be partial as a matter of what impartial morality 
demands.  
For required partiality, there are two camps available. According to 
Reductionism, associative duties are reducible to more basic special duties. 
This camp says that associative duties are reducible to more basic duties that morality 
typically countenances, and which are themselves grounded in more basic moral prin-
ciples. These may have to do with the moral significance of i) promises and contracts, 
ii) compensating benefactors through expressing gratitude, or iii) providing aid to 
those whom we have made particularly vulnerable to our actions, or iv) a general duty 
of beneficence.32   
According to  
 Non-reductionism, there exist sui generis associative duties. 
This camp says that some of our associative duties are duties that are irreducible to 
other more basic moral duties in the way that the reductionist suggests. For example, 
some nonreductionism views maintain intimate personal relationships between two 
people may ground sui generis duties of love.33  
 
31 Jackson (1991) is arguably another derivative account of partiality. 
32 See Goodin (1985), Sommers (1986). Simmons (1996) and Wellman (2001) for contem-
porary reductionist accounts of special duties. For a further overview see Seglow (2013), ch. 
1. Early modern theorists such as Ross (1930), Carrit (1947), and Prichard (2002) could also 
be understood as reductionist.  
33 See Scheffler (2002) ‘Relationships and Responsibilities’, Kolodny (2003), Jeske (2008), 
Wallace (2012), and Keller (2013). Most references in the next section are also referring to 




A prominent starting point for nonreductionism proceeds by appeal to the phenome-
nology of being partial. Versions of nonreductionism often say that, in paradigmatic 
instances of legitimate partiality when we are discharging our associative duties, our 
motives are, at the very least, an indication of the ground of associative duties.34 Others 
maintain that it is important harmony between our motives and reasons is in itself a 
good thing and that self-effacing theories that maintain a discrepancy between the to 
cannot be appropriately action-guiding.35  
The debate between reductionist and nonreductionist is at an impasse.36 Reductionists 
typically flat-out deny that that what motivates our adherence to our associative duties 
must also be the ground of its justification. Others may suggest that our motives indi-
cate that our existing basic moral duties ought to be discharged to a greater degree.37 
Progress could be made by better distinguishing the content of our associative duties 
from alleged supposed general duties to determine to what extent what we owe our 
intimates cannot be captured reductively.  
 
6. The Big Three 
The previous section considered partiality at the level of inputs and outputs, but there 
is also the further substantive question: what are the things that give us reasons or 
underivative permissions/duties? What are the grounds of partiality?   
Three main contenders are available: The Project View, The Relationship View, and 
the Individuals View.  
According to the  
 
34 See, for example, Keller (2013), p. 27: “It would be depressing if in paradigmatic cases of 
partiality, we are systematically misperceiving our reasons. […] It is difficult to see what sort 
of philosophical argument could convince you that when you act out of your special concern 
for your intimates, the things that really provide you with reason are different from the things 
that seem to provide you with reasons [Therefore,] our motives can sometimes be guides to 
our reasons.” 
35 Stocker (1976), pp. 453-55, and (1998), p. 173.  
36 See Wallace (2012), p. 183, who notes that “[...] there is, in my view, no knock-down 
argument in favour of the non-reductionist position.” 
37 Bazargan-Forward (2018) develops an account along these lines. Hurka (2016) argues that 




Project View, partiality is justified by appeal to the special value of ground 
projects.  
Bernard Williams (1981) has famously suggested that at least some of an agent’s 
ground-projects are fundamental components of the agent’s identity and give meaning 
to our lives.38 Projects must involve a certain amount and continuity of goal-oriented 
agency, since they would otherwise not be distinguishable from mere preferences, de-
sires, or wants. Thus, for an agent to have a parental project with central importance 
for their life, it must necessarily be the case that a certain set of its constitutive elements 
is sufficiently pervasive within that life. 
One challenge that the Project View faces is that it cannot account for associative du-
ties.39 If your project is to play the drums, then you may permissibly do so instead of 
doing other impartially better things, but it does not seem that you would be doing 
something wrong if you decided to give up this project. In response, the Project View 
can say that some joint projects may generate duties and that many of our personal 
relationships can be construed as such joint endeavours.40 Alternatively, we might 
think that associative duties are justified reductively; for example, the fact that you 
may have put someone in a vulnerable position with regard to you may create certain 
duties on your part toward them.41  
According to the  
Relationship View, partiality is justified by the appeal to the special value of 
personal relationships. 
There are different versions of the Relationship View. Some say that personal relation-
ships are valuable (or valued) for their own sakes and this fact explains why they can 
 
38 Williams (1981) pioneered the project view.  Other writers who have defended it include 
Wolf (1982, 1992), MacIntyre (1984), Sandel (1982), and Stroud (2010). Sandel and Mac-
Intyre especially focus on the commitments to the political community that has formed one’s 
identity and to which one owes one’s allegiance. 
39 See Scheffler (2004), pp. 258-260. 
40 Stroud (2010), pp. 143-149. 





justify partiality (permissions or duties, or both);42 others focus more on relationship 
facts and their reason-giving force.43  
The Relationship View has strong common-sensical support, but it also faces chal-
lenges. One worry is that in paradigmatic cases where we show special concern for our 
intimates, it does not seem that we are thinking about the relationship but rather about 
the individual to whom we are partial. This might suggest that the Relationship View 
does not fully accommodate the phenomenology of partiality.44 One way to defuse 
this worry is to draw attention to the fact that even the Relationship View can still 
make intimates the focus of value (valuing)—the person to whom you are partial.45 
According to the  
Individuals View, partiality is justified by the appeal to the special value of the 
value of individuals. 
The Individuals View says that partiality is justified by the individuals with whom our 
special relationships are shared.46 Rather than acting as reasons for treating those per-
sons better than others, our relationships act as enablers –that is, background condi-
tions that explain why some facts count as reasons for a given agent.47   
A main challenge for the Individuals view is that it seems to accomplish too much. It 
does not seem that it can explain why we should give more moral priority to our inti-
mates over strangers but instead denies that strangers have claims on us in the first 





42 See Raz (1989), Scheffler (2002; 2004) and Kolodny (2003). 
43 Views of this sort are put forward by Scanlon (1998) and Jeske (2008). 
44 Keller (2013), p. 63-4, presses this criticism. 
45 Kolodny (2003), pp. 154-7, especially p. 156, addresses this objection. See also Frankfurt 
(1998), p. 170.  
46 Keller (2013), p. 79 Implicit variants of this view can be found in Blum (1980), Friedman 
(1993), and Velleman (1999). Jollimore (2011) defends the view in a related debate about the 
reasons of love. 
47 For similar views, see Jollimore (2011) and Lord (2016). 





In this article, I have given an overview of the ethics of partiality literature, making 
clearer the various entry points ranging from questions about the good life and impar-
tialist moral theories to common-sense morality and supererogation.  
I have discussed the domain of permissible partiality, which concerns our moral op-
tions to act suboptimally and the domain of required partiality, which concerns our 
associative duties to act in certain ways toward people with whom we stand in a special 
personal relationship. At the level of justification, I sketched two main ‘high level’ 
frameworks to generate partiality, as well as the three main contenders at the finer-
grained level of what grounds options and associative duties.  
Let me conclude with some general remarks about the future of the ethics of partiality 
debate.  
As I alluded to previously, recently scholarship has turned to the negative mirror image 
of partiality to our intimates: the realm of negative partiality to our moral adversaries.49 
To recognise its existence, suppose that you conceive of yourself and your personal 
relationships as existing in a kind of moral space. You are closest to yourself. The moral 
distance between you and someone else is a function of your personal relationship, 
which is in turn constituted by histories of various forms of morally significant positive 
encounters: intimates are closer to you (and hence you can prioritise their interests 
more) than two loosely associated colleagues, who are in turn closer to you than 
strangers. Strangers represent how you may act independent of any special personal 
relationship. We can think of this relation as setting a baseline characterization of mo-
rality (or moral midpoint), relative to which you may be more or less partial depending 
on your positive or negative personal relationships. If intimates are located closer in 
moral space and strangers represent a moral midpoint, then there may also be people 
who are more distant than strangers. These people are your adversaries by virtue of a 
negative personal relationship with them. 
Negative partiality raises various new issues in the ethics of partiality debate: What 
forms of negative partiality exist? Are there options to discount our adversaries or could 
there also be duties to do so? Can ‘the big three’ account for negative partiality in the 
same way in which they are invoked to justify positive partiality? What is the 
 





relationship between positive and negative partiality? Can you favour your friends as 
much as you can dis-favour your enemies?50  
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